

MUA  
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MTA after queue  
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Spam-Source  
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# 7 Years in the Spam-Wars Trenches. Lessons Learned.


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ISG.EE - ETH Zürich

Linuxforum 2007

# About me

- For the last 7 years at the ISG.EE, ETH Zürich
- Main occupations: head of development, postmaster
- Open-source projects:  
Mailgraph, Postgrey, Gedafe, ISGTC
- <http://david.schweikert.ch/>



# MUA: Examples


- Thunderbird
- POPFile
- SpamBayes

# MUA: Pros

- **You** don't need to do anything
- The **users** are fully in control
- Nice user **interface**

# MUA: Cons

- Your **users** need to do it
- Bad on **slow links**
- Lots of mails in the spam folder  
→ just **delete them all**



# MTA after queue: Examples

## Programs:

- Amavisd-new
- SpamAssassin
- DSPAM

## Algorithms:

- Heuristics
- Bayes
- Collaborative filters  
(DCC, Razor)
- RBL/URIBL blacklists
- RFC-checks
- SPF, Sender-ID,  
DomainKeys



# MTA after queue: Pros

- Rather easy to **setup**
- Easy to update **technology**
- Full **flexibility**

# MTA after queue: Cons

- If you don't deliver a mail, you told a **lie** to the mail client
- Big **spam folders**
- Difficult **user interaction**

The user should be in control

# The user should be in control

- It's supposed to be a **service**
- There are always **false positives**
- **Opt-out** is good for low-risk techniques
- **Opt-in** is good for high-risk techniques

Do not throw away detected spam

# Do not throw away detected spam

- Do not throw it away, just **mark it**
- Leave the **Subject** line unchanged
- Recommend a **spam folder** instead of /dev/null
- **Exception** to the rule: viruses and phishing mails


Make it the safest as possible

# Make it the safest as possible

- **Scoring** systems are good (SpamAssassin)
- No **single rule** should be enough
- **Unsafe tests** are OK with a scoring system

# Use a global Bayes-DB

- Theory: what is considered spam is **individual**
- Reality: **poorly trained** DBs
- Do per-user Bayes in **Thunderbird**
- Global Bayes: help the **scoring**



# MTA before queue: Pros

- The **sender notices** immediately, that the mail is not going to be delivered
- No **dirty hands**
- Less mails in the **spam-folder**



## MTA before queue: Cons

- The mails are **gone**
- The users have little or **no control**
- Tricky **timing** issues

# MTA before queue: What to check?

Do NOT use:


- **RBL** blacklists
- **RFC**-checks
- **SPF, Sender-ID, DomainKeys**
- **Content-Filter**

What to check?

# MTA before queue: What to check?

OK:

- **Sanity** of sender+recip. **addresses**
- **Greylisting**
- **Teergrubing** (Tarpitting)



# Spam-Source: Sender Authentication

- SPF / SenderID
- DomainKeys / DKIM

## Consequence:

- Old: send mails through your **local ISP's** SMTP server
- New: send mails through your **home ISP's** SMTP server
- SMTP-AUTH

# Spam-Source: Port 25 Filtering

More and more providers do:

- **Block** outgoing **port 25** from dialup machines
- Example: WLAN network at the ETH Zurich
- Example: “Swiss ISPs Against Spam” initiative

# Spam-Source: Port 25 Filtering


- Breaks SMTP-AUTH!

Solution:

- Implement **port 587** (submission)
- Enforce TLS and SMTP-AUTH

# Spam-Source: Port 25 Filtering

Outlook's cleverness:



Where's **TLS** ?



# Spam-Source: Port 25 Filtering

```
if port == 25
    use SMTP/TLS
else
    use SMTP/SSL
```

## Consequence:

- Implement **port 465** too (smtps - SMTP/SSL)
- IANA: urd 465/tcp URL Rendezvous Directory for SSM

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# Questions?

